Decision Making With Risk-Based Weather Warnings by Mu, D et al.







University	  of	  Exeter	  Business	  School,	  Exeter,	  UK	  
	  
	  
Todd	  R.	  Kaplan	  
University	  of	  Exeter	  Business	  School,	  Exeter,	  UK	  
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter	  Business	  School	  for	  financial	  support	  and	  participants	  at	  the	  M2D	  (Models	  to	  Decisions)	  
1st	  Annual	  Conference	  on	  Decision	  Making	  under	  Uncertainty	  for	  useful	  feedback.	   	  
	  
2	  Corresponding	  author	  address:	  Di	  Mu,	  University	  of	  Exeter	  Business	  School,	  Streatham	  Court,	  Rennes	  Drive,	  Exeter,	  EX4	  4PU,UK	   	  
E-­‐mail:	  dm347@exeter.ac.uk	  
	  
Abstract	   	  
We	  study	  decisions	  under	  different	  weather	  warning	  systems	  that	  vary	  in	  format	  and/or	  information	  
conveyed	  using	  a	  laboratory	  experiment.	  Participants	  have	  to	  decide	  between	  a	  safe	  but	  costly	  
option	  (spending	  to	  protect	  from	  a	  storm)	  and	  a	  risky	  option	  (of	  not	  spending	  for	  protection).	  We	  
ran	  three	  treatments	  based	  upon	  the	  severe	  weather	  warning	  system	  for	  the	  UK	  that	  the	  Met	  Office	  
has	  been	  using	  since	  2011	  -­‐	  a	  risk	  matrix	  to	  communicate	  the	  impact	  and	  likelihood	  of	  an	  event.	  In	  
Treatment	  1,	  participants	  received	  a	  colored	  table	  with	  a	  check	  in	  the	  box	  of	  the	  matrix	  that	  showed	  
the	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  level	  of	  the	  warning.	  In	  Treatment	  2,	  participants	  had	  the	  colored	  table	  
and	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  communicated	  but	  without	  a	  check	  in	  the	  exact	  box.	  In	  Treatment	  3,	  
participants	  only	  had	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  communicated	  without	  seeing	  the	  associated	  table.	  
Overall	  our	  work	  shows	  that	  while	  increasing	  the	  information	  with	  content	  of	  warnings	  is	  usually	  
beneficial	  and	  increases	  the	  trust	  in	  the	  warning	  system,	  it	  must	  be	  done	  with	  caution	  since	  better	  
decisions	  (judged	  by	  higher	  profits)	  are	  not	  always	  made	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  information.	  




















High	  impact	  weather	  events	  significantly	  affect	  our	  lives	  and	  have	  done	  so	  throughout	  history.	   	   In	  
2005,	  hurricane	  Katrina	  in	  U.S	  caused	  75	  billion	  dollars	  worth	  of	  damage	  and	  over	  1,200	  deaths.3	   In	  
the	  final	  report	  of	  IPET	  Draft	  (Committee	  on	  New	  Orleans	  Regional	  Hurricane	  Protection	  Projects,	  
2009),	  the	  pre-­‐event	  risk	  assessment	  of	  Katrina	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  presentation	  of	  the	  risks.	  This	  
may	  have	  made	  decision-­‐making	  more	  difficult.	   	  
Early	  Warning	  Systems	  (EWS),	  combined	  with	  effective	  communication	  and	  emergency	  
preparedness	  at	  national	  and	  local	  levels,	  have	  a	  huge	  potential	  in	  limiting	  the	  human	  and	  economic	  
losses	  from	  natural	  disasters	  such	  as	  hurricane	  Katrina.	  Around	  the	  world,	  EWS	  have	  been	  developed	  
for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  hazards,	  most	  notably	  for	  extreme	  weather,	  floods	  and	  tsunamis,	  but	  also	  for	  
other	  hazards	  like	  snow	  avalanches,	  wildfires,	  landslides,	  earthquakes	  and	  volcanic	  eruptions,	  and	  
more	  complex	  hazards	  such	  as	  drought,	  food	  security	  and	  desertification	  (UNISDR,	  2006).	  For	  hydro	  
meteorological	  hazards,	  in	  particular,	  scientific	  and	  technological	  advances	  in	  recent	  decades	  have	  
resulted	  in	  a	  marked	  improvement	  in	  the	  quality,	  timeliness,	  and	  lead	  time	  of	  hazard	  warnings.	  The	  
adoption	  of	  ensemble	  prediction	  methods	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  shift	  towards	  quantitative	  probabilistic	  
forecasts,	  providing	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  and	  indicating	  the	  probability	  or	  chance	  of	  a	  
particular	  weather	  or	  flood	  event	  happening.	  
Both	  likelihood	  of	  an	  event	  and	  potential	  impact	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  weather	  forecast	  systems	  
(Doksaeter	  Sivle	  and	  Kolstø,	  2016),	  but	  also	  provide	  additional	  challenges	  to	  communication	  and	  
decision-­‐making	  (Demeritt	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Dale	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Deciding	  whether	  to	  evacuate	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  people	  or	  to	  issue	  a	  warning	  only	  to	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  needs	  to	  be	  risk-­‐based,	  meaning	  
the	  decision	  should	  be	  based	  not	  just	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  event	  happening,	  but	  also	  on	  its	  
consequences.	  A	  warning	  system	  can	  be	  enhanced	  by	  providing	  both	  these	  types	  of	  information	  
(Casteel,	  2016).	  
However,	  in	  many	  EWS	  currently	  in	  operation	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  forecasting	  the	  hazard,	  and	  impacts	  are	  
not	  commonly	  assessed.	  Already	  in	  2006	  the	  UNISDR	  noted	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  on	  risks	  and	  
vulnerabilities,	  and	  the	  limited	  engagement	  of	  relevant	  social	  sciences,	  as	  an	  area	  of	  weakness	  for	  
EWS	  (UNISDR,	  2006;	  Basher,	  2006).	  This	  also	  includes	  the	  integration	  of	  risk	  information	  into	  the	  
hazard	  warning	  itself.	  A	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  potential	  impact	  could	  help	  improve	  
decision	  making,	  which	  in	  turn	  could	  mitigate	  the	  damage.	  It	  could	  also	  result	  in	  warnings	  that	  are	  
more	  relevant	  to	  users	  and	  easier	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	  public	  at	  risk.	   	   	   	  
Within	  the	  UK,	  the	  National	  Severe	  Weather	  Warning	  Service	  (NSWWS)	  adopted	  a	  risk-­‐based	  
approach	  in	  2011.	  Before	  then,	  warnings	  were	  issued	  based	  on	  the	  chance	  of	  ‘widespread	  
disruption’,	  which	  was	  loosely	  defined	  and	  required	  a	  subjective	  judgement	  on	  the	  expected	  
disruption	  depending	  on	  the	  vulnerability	  within	  a	  county	  (Neal	  et	  al.	  2014).	  The	  current	  NSWWS	  
system	  improves	  on	  this	  by	  using	  a	  risk	  matrix,	  combining	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  particular	  severe	  
weather	  event	  on	  the	  vertical	  axis,	  and	  its	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  horizontal	  axis.	  Meteorologists	  
use	  their	  expert	  knowledge	  of	  the	  area	  forecast	  to	  be	  affected	  during	  the	  weather	  event	  to	  assess	  
the	  level	  of	  impact	  expected	  and	  therefore	  where	  to	  issue	  the	  ‘tick’	  on	  the	  horizontal	  axis.	  For	  the	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vertical	  axis,	  output	  from	  various	  models	  are	  analyzed	  to	  assess	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  event	  
occurring.	  These	  assessments	  are	  combined	  to	  determine	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  that	  is	  issued.	  
The	  specific	  level	  of	  risk	  –	  the	  tick	  in	  the	  matrix	  –	  is	  predominantly	  used	  in	  communications	  with	  
emergency	  managers,	  but	  is	  also	  available	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  headline	  message	  to	  the	  public,	  
however,	  is	  based	  around	  the	  overall	  warning	  color.	  
Our	  paper’s	  main	  objective	  is	  to	  evaluate	  this	  approach	  to	  early	  warnings	  using	  students	  making	  
decisions	  in	  an	  experimental	  laboratory.	   	  
Understanding	  how	  users	  make	  decisions	  with	  uncertain	  information	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  
and	  past	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  understanding	  and	  improving	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  with	  
weather	  forecasts	  and	  warnings.	  Our	  experimental	  methodology	  has	  been	  deployed	  
previously.	  	   Joslyn	  (2007)	  found	  that	  when	  probability	  information	  is	  provided,	  participants	  more	  
often	  make	  economically	  rational	  decisions.	  Roulston	  and	  Kaplan	  (2009)	  reported	  that	  by	  giving	  
participants	  graphical	  information	  (uncertainty	  information	  of	  the	  forecast)	  they	  were	  able	  to	  make	  
better	  decision	  than	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  provide	  with	  uncertainty	  information.	  Marimo	  et	  al.	  
(2015)	  found	  that	  participants	  make	  decisions	  faster	  when	  uncertainty	  information	  is	  provided	  in	  a	  
graph	  compared	  to	  a	  table.	  Abraham	  (2015)	  also	  showed	  that	  uncertainty	  information	  could	  affect	  
participants’	  decisions.	  Previous	  research	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  providing	  more	  information	  will	  
encourage	  people	  to	  make	  safer	  decisions	  (Ash	  et	  al.	  2014,	  Wickens	  et	  al.	  2000).	  These	  results	  
demonstrated	  that	  information	  can	  not	  only	  affect	  participants’	  decisions	  but	  also	  their	  risk	  
preferences.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  desire	  among	  users	  to	  receive	  more	  information	  in	  hope	  that	  it	  will	  lead	  
them	  to	  make	  better	  decisions.	  For	  instance,	  when	  uncertainty	  information	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  initial	  
forecast,	  85%	  of	  the	  participants	  choose	  to	  have	  additional	  information	  to	  help	  them	  make	  decisions	  
(Nadav-­‐Greenberg	  and	  Joslyn	  2009).	  However,	  Jacoby,	  Speller	  and	  Kohn	  (1974)	  found	  that	  when	  
people	  had	  more	  information,	  actually,	  they	  were	  making	  worse	  decisions	  even	  though	  they	  more	  
likely	  to	  feel	  satisfied	  and	  less	  confused.	  Sivle	  &	  Kolstø	  (2016)	  found	  that	  when	  people	  need	  to	  make	  
a	  quick	  decision,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  warning	  must	  be	  reduced.	   	   In	  extreme	  weather	  events,	  
people	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  short	  notice,	  so	  the	  right	  amount	  of	  information	  will	  help	  the	  
public	  as	  well	  as	  emergency	  manages	  and	  responders	  to	  understand	  the	  warning	  and	  make	  better	  
decisions.	   	  
Participants’	  decisions	  are	  not	  only	  related	  to	  the	  information	  conveyed.	  Winett	  and	  Kagel	  (1984)	  
found	  out	  when	  messages	  had	  the	  same	  information,	  the	  presentation	  format	  of	  the	  information	  
affected	  participants’	  decisions.	   	  
A	  key	  element	  in	  most	  warning	  systems,	  including	  the	  NSWWS,	  is	  the	  warning	  color.	  The	  color	  itself	  
can	  significantly	  affect	  participants’	  behaviour;	  Ryan	  (1991)	  showed	  the	  warning	  color	  red	  was	  
associated	  with	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  hazard	  followed	  by	  orange,	  yellow	  and	  green.	  In	  Braun	  and	  
Silver’s	  (1995)	  study	  when	  a	  red	  warning	  color	  resulted	  in	  higher	  compliance	  rate	  than	  green.	   	  
There	  are	  therefore	  two	  main	  interrelated	  questions	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  answer	  in	  the	  present	  paper:	  
(1)	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  that	  is	  included	  in	  the	  warning	  affect	  decisions?	   	  
(2)	  Does	  including	  information	  on	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  level	  lead	  to	  better	  decisions?	  
We	  try	  to	  answer	  these	  two	  questions	  with	  a	  lab-­‐based	  decision	  making	  experiment.	   	   The	  findings	  
of	  this	  paper	  have	  potential	  for	  application	  to	  communication	  of	  risk	  in	  other	  fields,	  as	  risk	  matrices	  
are	  used	  not	  just	  in	  weather	  warnings,	  but	  more	  widely	  in	  project	  management	  and	  corporate	  
planning,	  including	  by	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Federal	  Highway	  Administration4	   and	  the	  US	  
Federal	  Aviation	  Association5.	   	  
We	  also	  try	  to	  see	  if	  there	  are	  behaviour	  biases	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  Tversky	  and	  Kahneman,	  (1973)	  
indicated	  the	  decisions	  participants	  made	  are	  based	  on	  the	  results	  they	  have	  in	  the	  earlier	  periods,	  
and	  people	  may	  develop	  a	  bias.	  For	  instance,	  a	  person	  who	  has	  suffered	  serious	  damage	  from	  a	  
previous	  storm	  will	  have	  a	  biased	  perception	  of	  the	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  level.	  We	  consider	  
whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  "Cry	  Wolf	  Effect."	  Jared	  LeClerc	  and	  Susan	  Joslyn	  (2015)	  show	  that	  there	  is	  
an	  effect	  in	  that	  subjects	  tend	  to	  trust	  the	  warning	  system	  more	  and	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  
improvement	  in	  decision	  quality	  as	  the	  false	  alarm	  level	  decreases.	  
2.	  Experimental	  design/method	  
In	  total,	  341	  University	  of	  Exeter	  undergraduate	  students	  from	  various	  disciplines	  were	  recruited	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  experimental	  sessions.	  There	  were	  145	  male	  and	  196	  female	  students;	  149	  year	  
one	  students,	  105	  year	  two	  students	  and	  87	  year	  three	  students.	  We	  used	  the	  recruitment	  software	  
ORSEE	  (Greiner,	  2015)	  and	  all	  sessions	  used	  software	  programmed	  in	  z-­‐Tree	  (Fischbacher,	  2007).	  The	  
sessions	  were	  computer	  based	  in	  sizes	  of	  30	  and	  took	  place	  in	  the	  Finance	  and	  Economics	  
Experimental	  Laboratory	  (FEELE).	  Each	  participant's	  payoff	  only	  depended	  upon	  his/her	  decisions	  
and	  not	  that	  of	  other	  participants.	  The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  60	  rounds	  of	  questions	  plus	  three	  
test	  questions	  at	  the	  start	  and	  a	  questionnaire	  afterwards.	   	  
The	  use	  of	  students	  as	  participants	  in	  this	  type	  of	  lab	  experiment	  is	  widely	  accepted	  as	  standard	  
(Harrison	  and	  List,	  2004).	  As	  the	  variances	  in	  age,	  education	  and	  income	  are	  small,	  internal	  validity	  
can	  be	  assured	  (any	  difference	  of	  results	  among	  treatments	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  
treatments	  themselves	  rather	  than	  difference	  between	  the	  subjects	  allocated	  to	  each	  treatment).	  
Non-­‐students	  will	  have	  a	  larger	  variance	  of	  background	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  which	  would	  
affect	  the	  internal	  validity.	  To	  assure	  the	  external	  validity	  (i.e.,	  the	  results	  apply	  to	  decisions	  
elsewhere),	  an	  important	  element	  is	  experimental	  realism.	  We	  do	  this	  by	  using	  a	  real	  payoff	  in	  cash	  
with	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  participants	  affecting	  their	  payoffs.	  Furthermore,	  a	  warning	  of	  severe	  
weather	  is	  also	  something	  that	  may	  face	  in	  their	  real	  life	  and	  the	  experiment	  is	  framed	  as	  such.	  Thus,	  
by	  doing	  so	  using	  students	  in	  an	  experimental	  study	  will	  not	  reduce	  experimental	  realism	  and	  not	  
affect	  external	  validity	  (Druckman	  and	  Kam,	  2009).	  
In	  each	  round	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  asked	  a	  question	  framed	  as	  deciding	  whether	  or	  
not	  to	  move	  a	  product	  into	  a	  warehouse	  after	  they	  receiving	  a	  warning	  of	  coming	  a	  storm.	  Moving	  
the	  product	  involves	  a	  fixed	  cost	  but	  no	  risk	  from	  the	  storm.	  Not	  moving	  has	  no	  fixed	  cost	  but	  risks	  
damage	  from	  the	  storm.	  Participants	  were	  divided	  into	  three	  treatments	  according	  to	  the	  
information	  given	  to	  them.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   	   California	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  Federal	  Highway	  Administration,	  California	  Division.	  (2007).	  Systems	  Engineering	  Guidebook	  
for	  ITS	  Version	  2.0.	  
5	   	   Federal	  Aviation	  Administration.	  (2007).	  Introduction	  to	  Safety	  Management	  Systems	  (SMA)	  for	  Airport	  Operators	  (Advisory	  Circular),	  
February	  28,	  2007.	  Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation.	  
Treatment	  1:	  Colored	  table	  with	  a	  check	  in	  the	  box	  that	  shows	  both	  what	  the	  likelihood	  and	  
potential	  damage	  is.	  
Treatment	  2:	  Colored	  table	  without	  a	  check	  in	  the	  exact	  box,	  but	  with	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  
communicated.	  







Figure	  1:	  The	  form	  of	  the	  warnings	  presented	  in	  Treatments	  1,	  2	  and	  3.	  In	  the	  matrix,	  likelihoods	  were	  
20%,	  40%,	  60%,	  and	  80%	  (this	  information	  is	  not	  available	  to	  participants)	  and	  impact	  level	  
corresponded	  from	  1	  to	  4.	  
The	  warning	  in	  Treatment	  1	  shows	  impact	  level	  and	  likelihood	  level	  information.	  The	  warning	  in	  
Treatment	  2	  shows	  only	  information	  about	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning,	  but	  participants	  are	  visually	  
shown	  how	  this	  color	  can	  vary	  according	  to	  likelihood	  and	  impact.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  3	  
receive	  information	  about	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  only.	  
The	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  three	  Treatments	  is	  as	  follows:	   	  
T1:	  Impact/likelihood	  information	  (although	  no	  precise	  probabilities):	  this	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  
information	  that	  is	  available	  from	  the	  current	  Met	  Office	  warning	  system.	  
T3:	  Color	  only:	  this	  is	  the	  top-­‐level	  information	  that	  is	  mostly	  communicated	  to	  the	  public;	  also	  most	  
“traditional”	  warning	  systems	  (also	  for	  other	  areas	  beyond	  weather)	  use	  a	  simple	  color	  level	  
approach.	  
T2:	  Participants	  are	  visually	  reminded	  that	  the	  warning	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  impact	  and	  likelihood,	  
but	  only	  the	  color	  is	  communicated.	  This	  is	  an	  intermediate	  step	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  better	  explain	  
some	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  T1	  and	  T3.	  
For	  instance	  when	  we	  compare	  T1	  and	  T2,	  we	  can	  find	  out	  whether	  including	  the	  impact/likelihood	  
information	  leads	  to	  better	  decisions.	  When	  we	  compare	  T2	  with	  T3	  we	  learn	  whether	  awareness	  of	  
uncertainty	  in	  impact/likelihood	  leads	  to	  better	  decisions.	  When	  we	  compare	  T1	  with	  T3	  we	  can	  test	  
how	  information	  on	  impact	  and	  likelihood	  affect	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  participants.	  This	  risk-­‐based	  
warning	  system	  that	  is	  tested	  in	  Treatment	  3	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  warning	  system	  for	  severe	  weather	  
in	  the	  UK.	  This	  system	  targets	  different	  audiences;	  for	  example,	  the	  main	  warning	  message	  to	  the	  
public	  is	  based	  on	  the	  color	  only.	  The	  impact/likelihood	  information	  (i.e.,	  the	  position	  to	  the	  matrix)	  
is	  also	  available	  to	  the	  public	  (on	  the	  Met	  Office	  website)	  but	  is	  used	  more	  in	  the	  communication	  to	  
emergency	  managers	  and	  the	  responder	  community.	   	  
The	  information	  to	  the	  participants	  was	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum	  too	  allow	  them	  to	  answer	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  questions	  within	  reasonable	  time.	  Clearly,	  an	  experimental	  setting	  like	  ours	  is	  always	  
going	  to	  be	  different	  from	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  real	  world;	  however	  also	  in	  the	  real	  world	  the	  
amount	  of	  information	  received	  by	  the	  public	  through	  TV,	  radio	  and	  newspapers	  may	  well	  be	  limited	  
to	  headlines	  only.	  The	  Met	  Office	  provides	  more	  detail	  information	  on	  weather	  warnings,	  for	  
example	  on	  its	  website,	  however	  this	  information	  is	  only	  viewed	  by	  a	  part	  of	  the	  public,	  although	  
admittedly	  professional	  users	  may	  well	  obtain	  more	  detailed	  information.	  Sivle	  (2018)	  indicated	  that	  
the	  general	  public	  may	  not	  have	  enough	  background	  study	  to	  understand	  the	  more	  detailed	  
information	  in	  weather	  warnings.	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  used	  university	  students	  from	  diverse	  
backgrounds	  as	  experiment	  participants,	  so	  arguably	  our	  results	  should	  represent	  more	  the	  general	  
public	  rather	  than	  professional	  decision	  makers.	  
	   	  





Figure	  2:	  Payoff	  information	  shown	  to	  participants	  in	  Treatments	  1,	  2	  and	  3.	  (The	  payoff	  function	  and	  
probability	  of	  each	  payoff	  type	  is	  consist	  though	  all	  treatments.)	  
The	  format	  of	  the	  warning	  is	  the	  same	  for	  every	  participant	  in	  the	  same	  treatment,	  but	  the	  impact	  
level,	  likelihood	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  storm	  actually	  happened	  are	  randomly	  generated	  by	  the	  
computer.	  The	  probability	  of	  receiving	  a	  green,	  yellow,	  amber	  or	  red	  warning	  is	  was	  set	  at	  10%,	  30%,	  
30%,	  30%,	  respectively.	  The	  reason	  that	  the	  green	  warning	  only	  has	  a	  10%	  chance	  of	  beign	  chosen	  is	  
because	  the	  green	  warning	  is	  the	  default	  status	  and	  we	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  how	  people	  behave	  
while	  receiving	  an	  actual	  warning,	  that	  is,	  yellow,	  amber,	  or	  red.	  Once	  a	  color	  was	  selected,	  there	  
was	  an	  equal	  probability	  of	  each	  box	  within	  the	  matrix	  with	  that	  color	  being	  selected.	  Participants	  
were	  not	  told	  the	  probability	  of	  each	  warning	  or	  the	  likelihood	  of	  each	  box	  being	  selected	  and	  were	  
not	  informed	  about	  the	  precise	  likelihood	  of	  each	  storm	  level	  occurring	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
columns	  in	  the	  risk	  matrix	  (which	  were	  20%,	  40%,	  60%,	  and	  80%),	  but	  were	  told	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  
damage	  associated	  with	  each	  storm	  level.	  So	  they	  needed	  to	  build	  their	  own	  judgement	  of	  the	  
warning	  system	  to	  make	  decisions	  with	  different	  payoff	  functions.	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  period	  (each	  period	  has	  one	  question	  to	  answer);	  participants	  received	  
2000	  tokens,	  and	  then	  had	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  the	  product	  to	  a	  warehouse	  after	  they	  
received	  a	  warning	  of	  a	  storm.	   	   The	  payoff	  function	  for	  the	  participants	  at	  each	  period	  is	  below.	  The	  
decision	  that	  participants	  made	  and	  their	  payoff	  in	  the	  previous	  period	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  initial	  
tokens	  after	  period.	   	  
2000(𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) −𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡    (𝑖𝑓  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑡𝑜  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒)2000 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚    (𝑖𝑓    𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑)2000 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡     (𝑖𝑓    𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚  𝑑𝑖𝑑  𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟) 	  
There	  were	  four	  different	  payoff	  functions:	  low	  damage,	  high	  damage,	  likelihood	  sensitive	  and	  
impact	  sensitive,	  determining	  the	  amount	  of	  damage	  associated	  with	  each	  level	  of	  storm.	  The	  
damage	  of	  every	  type	  and	  level	  are	  showed	  in	  the	  Table	  1	  below.	   	  
Type\level	   Level	  1	   Level	  2	   Level	  3	   Level	  4	   Moving	  cost	  
Low	  damage	   300	   600	   900	   1200	   500	  
High	  damage	   600	   1000	   1400	   1800	   500	  
Likelihood	  sensitive	   925	   975	   1025	   1075	   500	  
Impact	  sensitive	   300	   400	   1600	   1700	   500	  
Table	  1:	  Damage	  of	  each	  impact	  level	  in	  each	  payoff	  function	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  moving.	  
When	  making	  decisions,	  in	  the	  impact	  sensitive	  payoff	  function,	  the	  difference	  in	  damage	  between	  
impact	  level	  2	  and	  level	  3	  is	  larger	  than	  in	  any	  other	  payoff	  function,	  so	  participants	  will	  be	  more	  
sensitive	  to	  the	  impact	  level.	   	  
In	  reality,	  people	  will	  be	  heterogeneously	  affected	  by	  weather	  events,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  impact	  may	  
be	  different	  for	  different	  users.	  In	  real	  life,	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  decision	  will	  almost	  never	  be	  as	  clearly	  
defined	  as	  in	  our	  experiment,	  and	  the	  impact	  depends	  on	  the	  level	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  hazard,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  people,	  area	  or	  assets	  being	  affected.	  The	  vulnerability	  in	  turn	  may	  
depend	  on	  a	  range	  of	  factors,	  including	  the	  capacity	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  hazard.	  
Participants	  can	  also	  be	  affected	  by	  other	  factors	  as	  well,	  for	  example	  the	  maximum	  value	  of	  the	  
damage,	  the	  real	  payoff	  function	  can	  be	  different	  for	  each	  person	  and	  much	  more	  complicated.	  
However,	  the	  choices	  made	  are	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  being	  able	  to	  test	  the	  differences	  between	  
payoff	  structures,	  and	  not	  introducing	  too	  much	  variability	  between	  payoffs,	  and	  not	  too	  many	  
different	  payoff	  structures.	  In	  our	  experiment,	  exposure	  is	  implicitly	  assumed	  to	  be	  there,	  while	  the	  
varying	  levels	  of	  impact	  in	  the	  different	  payoff	  functions	  reflect	  different	  sensitivities	  of	  the	  people	  
to	  the	  weather,	  which	  may	  result	  in	  different	  responses.	  
Each	  participant	  faced	  15	  periods	  of	  each	  type	  of	  payoffs,	  and	  the	  order	  was	  random	  to	  control	  for	  
any	  learning	  effect.	   	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  End	  of	  period	  results	  presented	  to	  every	  participant.	  (If	  a	  storm	  did	  not	  occur	  it	  may	  be	  that	  
the	  storm	  occurred	  elsewhere	  and	  thus	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  decision	  maker.)	  
Instructions	  were	  provided	  to	  participants	  on	  paper	  (see	  the	  Appendix).	  After	  reading	  the	  
instructions,	  each	  participant	  needed	  to	  finish	  three	  test	  questions	  (also	  see	  the	  Appendix).	  If	  they	  
answered	  a	  test	  question	  wrong,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  stop	  and	  wait	  for	  explanation	  before	  
they	  move	  on	  to	  the	  main	  part	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Participants	  were	  given	  the	  warning	  (Figure	  1)	  and	  
the	  payoff	  information	  (Figure	  2)	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  After	  choosing	  whether	  to	  move	  or	  not	  move	  the	  
product	  they	  are	  responsible	  for,	  they	  saw	  the	  results	  in	  a	  screen	  similar	  to	  Figure	  3:	  the	  initial	  
endowment,	  the	  level	  of	  the	  storm	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  storm	  occurred,	  their	  decision	  at	  this	  period,	  
and	  the	  profit	  after	  each	  question.	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment	  participants	  were	  paid	  £5	  plus	  £1	  for	  every	  2000	  tokens	  they	  made	  in	  5	  
randomly	  chosen	  periods.	  The	  average	  participant	  profit	  per	  period	  was	  1525	  tokens.	  This	  was	  
slightly	  below	  what	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  make	  (1527	  tokens)	  given	  their	  decisions.	  This	  contrasts	  
with	  the	  1561	  tokens	  they	  would	  make	  if	  they	  chose	  the	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  decision	  every	  
period	  in	  Treatment	  1.	  Cash	  reward	  is	  standard	  in	  the	  field	  of	  experimental	  economics.	  The	  
benchmark	  is	  the	  incentivized	  version	  with	  researchers	  concerned	  that	  lack	  of	  monetary	  incentives	  
(or	  insufficient	  incentives)	  will	  affect	  results.	  
	  
3.	  Data	  analysis	  
We	  define	  the	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  decision	  (HEPD)	  as	  the	  choice	  with	  higher	  expected	  
monetary	  payoff	  given	  full	  information	  about	  the	  potential	  impact	  and	  likelihood	  include	  the	  impact	  
level,	  likelihood	  level	  and	  likelihood	  of	  each	  storm	  level	  occurring	  corresponding	  to	  the	  columns	  in	  
the	  risk	  matrix.	  The	  reason	  that	  we	  want	  to	  measure	  this	  variable	  as	  higher	  fraction	  of	  HEPD	  can	  
represent	  a	  better	  warning	  system	  (judged	  by	  higher	  profits)	  
We	  define	  the	  conditional	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  decision	  (conditional	  HEPD)	  as	  the	  choice	  with	  
higher	  expected	  monetary	  payoff	  given	  information	  received	  by	  the	  participant	  and	  likelihood	  of	  
each	  storm	  level	  occurring	  corresponding	  to	  the	  columns	  in	  the	  risk	  matrix.	  This	  also	  assumes	  the	  
ability	  for	  the	  participants	  to	  learn	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  experiment.	   	   For	  Treatments	  1	  and	  2,	  they	  
must	  learn	  that	  each	  likelihood	  level	  corresponding	  likelihood	  probability	  indicated	  for	  each	  box,	  20%	  
to	  80%.	  For	  Treatment	  2,	  they	  must	  learn	  that	  each	  box	  with	  a	  color	  was	  selected	  with	  an	  equal	  
chance.	  For	  Treatment	  3,	  they	  must	  learn	  the	  overall	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  that	  a	  warning	  indicates.	   	  
So	  making	  the	  conditional	  HEPDs	  could	  be	  challenging.	  This	  variable	  can	  used	  to	  measure	  how	  
participants	  understand/follow	  the	  warning.	  
We	  were	  also	  interested	  in	  how	  participants	  behaved	  when	  they	  did	  not	  made	  decisions	  that	  were	  
the	  HEPD.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  define	  risk	  direction	  as	  follows.	  If	  participants	  choose	  the	  conditional	  HEPD,	  
then	  the	  risk	  direction	  is	  assigned	  0.	  If	  the	  conditional	  HEPD	  is	  ‘move’	  and	  the	  participants	  choose	  
‘not	  move’,	  then	  risk	  direction	  is	  assigned	  1.	  If	  the	  conditional	  HEPD	  is	  ‘not	  move’	  and	  participants	  
choose	  ‘move’,	  then	  risk	  direction	  is	  assigned-­‐1.	  Risk	  direction	  represents	  a	  participants’	  
risk-­‐aversion	  level.	  High	  risk	  direction	  means	  that	  participants	  favour	  a	  more	  risky	  option	  (not	  move)	  
over	  the	  conditional	  HEPD,	  while	  low	  risk	  direction	  means	  participants	  more	  often	  choose	  a	  risk	  free	  
option	  (move)	  over	  the	  conditional	  HEPD.	   	  
We	  also	  tested	  the	  response	  time	  as	  well,	  but	  found	  that	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  
response	  time	  between	  different	  treatment	  groups,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  relation	  between	  
response	  time	  and	  proportion	  of	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  decisions.	  This	  latter	  result	  contrasts	  with	  
work	  of	  Kahneman	  (1979)	  and	  Rubinstein	  (2007),	  who	  found	  in	  many	  cases	  those	  that	  responded	  
quicker	  chose	  differently	  than	  those	  who	  responded	  slower.	  
In	  this	  section,	  we	  analyze	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  participants.	  In	  order	  to	  reduce	  noise	  in	  the	  analysis,	  
we	  use	  the	  expected	  profit	  based	  upon	  a	  participant's	  decision	  rather	  than	  actual	  payments	  received.	  
This	  eliminates	  the	  noise	  of	  induced	  from	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  storm	  occurred.	   	  
Result	  1:	  The	  participants	  that	  received	  information	  on	  both	  the	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  levels	  not	  only	  
had	  higher	  expected	  profits	  but	  made	  decisions	  with	  higher	  expected	  payoffs	  given	  their	  information	  
than	  participants	  receiving	  only	  the	  warning	  color.	   	   	   	  
To	  analyze	  the	  difference	  between	  different	  treatments,	  we	  compare	  the	  expected	  profit	  per	  period.	  
One-­‐way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  difference	  between	  treatments	  is	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  20457)	  =61.04,	  
p<0.001)	  in	  expected	  profit	  per	  period.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  significant	  (significant	  is	  
defined	  at	  5%	  level)	  higher	  expected	  payoffs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=-­‐10.52,	  p<0.001)	  
and	  3(t=-­‐7.49,	  0.001).	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  2	  and	  
Treatment	  3(t=1.45,	  p=0.146).	   	  
	   Expected	  profit	  per	  




conditional	  HEPDs	   	  
Standard	  
deviation	   	  
Treatment	  1	   1541	   147	   82.9%	   37.6	  
Treatment	  2	   1515	   159	   78.8%	   40.8	  
Treatment	  3	   1520	   160	   80.1%	   39.9	  
Table	  2：Expected	  profit	  per	  period	  and	  percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  in	  Treatment	  1,	  2	  and	  3.	  
A	  similar	  relationship	  holds	  on	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs.	   	   Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  make	  the	  HEPDs	  than	  the	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=-­‐6.54,	  p<0.001)	  and	  
Treatment	  3(t=-­‐3.76,	  p<0.001).	  The	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3	  is	  not	  significant	  (t=1.80,	  
p=0.072).	  When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs,	  the	  differences	  between	  Treatment	  1	  and	  the	  
other	  two	  treatments	  (Treatment	  2	  (t=-­‐11.28,	  p<0.001),	  Treatment	  3	  (t=-­‐8.25,	  p<0.001))	  are	  
significant.	   	   The	  difference	  between	  treatments	  2	  and	  3	  is	  not	  significant	  (t=1.34,	  p=0.181).	  
Result	  2:	  Higher	  warning	  levels	  increased	  the	  percentage	  of	  both	  highest	  and	  conditional	  HEPDs,	  but	  
the	  expected	  profit	  still	  decreased.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  find	  out	  how	  participants	  behaved	  under	  different	  situations.	  When	  presented	  with	  
a	  yellow	  warning	  participants’	  expected	  profit	  per	  period	  was	  significantly	  higher	  (t=	  38.04,	  p<0.001)	  
with	  amber	  warnings,	  while	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  was	  significantly	  lower	  (t=-­‐	  33.69,	  
p<0.001).	   	   Participants	  had	  the	  highest	  expected	  profit	  when	  the	  warning	  color	  was	  green	  (1719)	  
and	  the	  lowest	  expected	  profit	  (1467)	  when	  the	  color	  was	  red.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  expected	  damage	  when	  not	  moving	  is	  higher	  at	  higher	  warning	  levels.	  
Participants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  conditional	  HEPDs	  when	  the	  warning	  color	  is	  red	  (94.8%)	  than	  
with	  other	  colors.	  Participants	  made	  the	  lowest	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  (62.8%)	  when	  the	  
warning	  color	  was	  yellow.	  Also	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  HEPDs,	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  
HEPDs	  with	  red	  warnings	  (94.8%)	  than	  other	  colors.	  The	  lowest	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  (61.7%)	  
was	  obtained	  when	  the	  warning	  color	  was	  yellow.	   	  
These	  results	  show	  that	  participants	  behaved	  differently	  based	  upon	  the	  level	  (color)	  of	  the	  warning	  
they	  received.	  With	  green	  warnings,	  participants	  made	  more	  profit	  than	  in	  any	  other	  situation,	  not	  
surprising	  given	  that	  the	  expected	  damage	  is	  lowest.	  With	  warnings	  ranging	  from	  yellow	  to	  red,	  the	  
fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  increased	  from	  62.8%	  to	  94.8%.	  This	  shows	  that	  if	  expected	  damage	  
increases,	  participants	  will	  behave	  more	  according	  to	  the	  HEPDs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  participants	  
made	  less	  profit	  as	  the	  expected	  damage	  increased.	  




Percent	  of	  HEPDs	  
Green	  warning	   1719	   79.6%	   79.3%	  
Yellow	  warning	   1566	   62.8%	   61.7%	  
Amber	  warning	   1474	   85.5%	   80.0%	  
Red	  warning	   1467	   94.8%	   94.8%	  
Table	  3：Expected	  profit	  per	  period,	  percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  percent	  of	  HEPDs	  in	  different	  
warning	  level.	  
We	  now	  examine	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  for	  each	  color	  warning.	  
Differences	  between	  treatments	  for	  green	  warnings	  
For	  green	  warning,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  
2201)	  =	  7.87,	  p<0.001)	  for	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  for	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  2201)	  
=	  9.27,	  p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  made	  significantly	  more	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  
participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=2.43,	  p=0.015)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=3.59,	  p<0.001).	  Similar	  to	  the	  
overall	  case	  there	  are	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3	  in	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  
HEPDs.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  also	  made	  significantly	  more	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  2	  (t=2.73,	  p<0.006)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=3.75,	  p<0.001),	  similar	  to	  the	  overall	  case	  there	  
was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  Treatments	  2	  and	  3	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs.	   	  
Differences	  between	  treatments	  for	  yellow	  warnings	  
For	  yellow	  warning,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  among	  all	  three	  treatments	  are	  
significant	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  6221)	  =	  46.54,	  p<0.001)	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  20116)	  =	  57.43,	  p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  made	  more	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=	  9.61,	  p<0.001)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=	  4.76,	  
p<0.001),	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  3	  significantly	  made	  more	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  2	  (t=3.42,	  p<0.001).	  A	  similar	  pattern	  was	  observed	  with	  the	  HEPDs.	  
Differences	  between	  treatments	  for	  amber	  warnings	  
For	  amber	  warnings,	  one-­‐way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	   	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  6026)	  =	  10.15,	  p<0.001)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  6026)	  =	  11.64,	  p<0.001).	  These	  results	  also	  show	  that	  differences	  in	  
participants’	  behaviour	  between	  treatments	  decreased	  (F	  value	  decreased)	  as	  the	  warning	  color	  
went	  up	  from	  yellow	  to	  amber.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  made	  significantly	  less	  often	  to	  choice	  for	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=	  -­‐3.83,	  p<0.001)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=	  -­‐3.77,	  
p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3	  had	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  
conditional	  HEPDs.	  However	  as	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  full	  information	  about	  likelihood	  and	  
impact	  level,	  they	  made	  significantly	  more	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=	  4.71,	  p<0.001)	  
and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=	  2.95,	  p=0.003)	  while	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  2	  
and	  3.	  HEPDs	  is	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  HEPDs	  if	  they	  all	  have	  full	  information	  about	  likelihood	  
and	  impact	  level,	  conditional	  HEPDs	  are	  the	  highest	  payoff	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  information	  they	  
have.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  higher	  fraction	  of	  highest	  payoff	  decisions	  and	  lower	  fraction	  
of	  conditional	  highest	  payoff	  decisions	  means	  overall	  they	  more	  often	  to	  choose	  HEPDs	  as	  they	  have	  
more	  information,	  but	  worse	  understanding	  of	  the	  warning	  than	  the	  other	  two	  groups.	   	   	  
Differences	  between	  treatments	  for	  red	  warnings	  
When	  the	  participants	  are	  issued	  with	  a	  red	  warning,	  the	  HEPDs	  is	  always	  move	  (risk	  free	  decision),	  
so	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  and	  HEPDs	  are	  the	  always	  same.	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  the	  
differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  for	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  and	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (F	  (2,	  
6000)	  =	  14.99,	  p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  made	  significantly	  more	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  
participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=	  4.98,	  p<0.001)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=	  4.18,	  p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  
Treatments	  2	  and	  3	  do	  not	  show	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs.	  
These	  results	  show	  that	  participants	  in	  each	  treatment	  respond	  differently	  to	  a	  given	  warning.	  
Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  the	  highest	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  cross	  all	  four	  warning	  colors;	  however	  
they	  had	  the	  lowest	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  when	  for	  amber	  warnings.	  There	  is	  another	  
interesting	  point:	  when	  issued	  with	  a	  red	  warning,	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  and	  2	  had	  exactly	  
same	  information	  (there	  is	  only	  one	  box	  in	  the	  warning	  matrix	  which	  is	  red).	  However,	  the	  data	  
shows	  that	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  made	  significantly	  more	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  2,	  while	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  between	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3.	  In	  other	  
words,	  people	  follow	  the	  warning	  more	  by	  providing	  more	  information	  about	  the	  impact	  level	  and	  
likelihood	  level.	   	  
Result	  3.	  Participants’	  behaviour	  varied	  depending	  upon	  their	  payoff	  functions.	  
Participants	  behaved	  differently	  under	  different	  types	  of	  payoff	  functions.	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  
the	  differences	  between	  types	  of	  payoffs	  are	  significant	  in	  expected	  payoffs	  per	  period	  (F	  (3,	  20456)	  
=	  119.02,	  p<0.001)	  and	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (F	  (3,	  20456)	  =	  105.26,	  p<0.001).	  With	  a	  
low	  damage	  payoff	  function	  (the	  damage	  is	  lower	  for	  each	  impact	  level	  comparing	  with	  high	  damage	  
payoff),	  the	  participants’	  expected	  payoff	  per	  period	  is	  significantly	  higher	  (t=16.91,	  p<0.001)	  than	  
with	  a	  high	  damage	  payoffs,	  while	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  is	  significantly	  lower	  (t=-­‐7.54,	  
p<0.001).	  
Comparing	  all	  four	  types	  of	  payoff	  functions,	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  conditional	  
HEPDs	  with	  impact	  sensitive	  payoffs	  (85.3%),	  and	  had	  the	  lowest	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  (73.4%)	  
when	  they	  were	  answering	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoff	  questions.	  




Fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  
Low	  damage	   1552	   79.1%	   76.5%	  
High	  damage	   1500	   84.9%	   82.1%	  
Likelihood	  sensitive	   1514	   73.4%	   72.4%	  
Impact	  sensitive	   1540	   85.3%	   83.6%	  
Table	  4：Expected	  profit	  per	  period,	  percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  percent	  of	  HEPDs	  for	  different	  
payoff	  functions.	  
We	  see	  that	  payoff	  type	  has	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  both	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD	  and	  earnings	  
per	  period	  (Table	  4).	  By	  increasing	  the	  impact	  level	  (damage)	  of	  the	  storm	  and	  moving	  cost	  
unchanged,	  the	  expected	  profit	  per	  period	  decreases;	  however,	  with	  higher	  damages	  participants	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  conditional	  HEPD.	  Results	  also	  indicate	  that	  participants	  more	  often	  
behave	  risk	  neutral	  with	  impact	  sensitive	  payoff	  compared	  to	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoff,	  potentially	  
proving	  participants	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  impact	  level	  rather	  than	  the	  overall	  likelihood.	  
Participants	  chose	  to	  move	  significantly	  more	  often	  with	  the	  impact	  sensitive	  payoff	  than	  with	  the	  
other	  payoff	  functions.	  
Participants	  in	  different	  treatments	  groups	  behaved	  differently	  in	  each	  individual	  question	  type.	  To	  
find	  out	  how	  do	  different	  treatments	  affect	  participants	  under	  different	  payoff	  function,	  we	  looked	  
at	  participants	  expected	  payoff	  based	  on	  their	  decisions,	  expected	  payoff	  if	  they	  only	  made	  the	  
highest	  expected	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  information	  they	  had,	  and	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  and	  







Low	  damage	   Participants’	   HEPD	  strategy	   Percent	  of	   Percent	  of	  HEPDs	  
decision	   conditional	  HEPDs	  
Treatment	  1	   1566	   1593	   78.9%	   78.9%	  
Treatment	  2	   1539	   1582	   78.4%	   73.7%	  
Treatment	  3	   1551	   1586	   80.6%	   77.2%	  
High	  damage	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	  1	   1512	   1545	   84.8%	   84.8%	  
Treatment	  2	   1494	   1520	   85.6%	   80.6%	  
Treatment	  3	   1491	   1522	   84.1%	   80.0%	  
Likelihood	  sensitive	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	  1	   1538	   1566	   82.0%	   82.0%	  
Treatment	  2	   1500	   1525	   69.3%	   67.7%	  
Treatment	  3	   1495	   1533	   65.2%	   63.6%	  
Impact	  sensitive	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	  1	   1549	   1587	   85.7%	   85.7%	  
Treatment	  2	   1528	   1580	   81.8%	   80.3%	  
Treatment	  3	   1542	   1578	   90.6%	   85.7%	  
Table	  5：Expected	  profit	  per	  period	  based	  on	  participants'	  decisions,	  HEPD	  strategy	  based	  on	  the	  
information	  they	  have	  in	  each	  treatment	  for	  each	  payoff	  functions,	  percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  









highest	  expected	  payoff	  decision	  (HEPD)	  
	  Figure	  4:	  Percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  percent	  of	  HEPDs	  in	  each	  treatment	  for	  each	  payoff	  
functions.	  
Low	  damage	  payoffs	  
For	  low	  damage	  payoffs,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  
significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  =	  16.61,	  p<0.001)	  in	  expected	  profit	  per	  period.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  
had	  significantly	  higher	  expected	  profit	  per	  period	  compared	  to	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=2.76,	  
p=0.006)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=5.75,	  p<0.001).	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  
Treatments	  1	  and	  3	  in	  HEPDs.	  Similar	  to	  the	  overall	  result	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  
Treatments	  2	  and	  3	  in	  profit	  per	  period.	  However,	  unlike	  the	  overall	  result	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  
difference	  between	  treatments	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  
differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  not	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  =	  1.08,	  p=0.3408).	   	   When	  we	  look	  at	  
the	  fraction	  HEPD,	  one-­‐way	  ANOVA	  shows	  that	  in	  this	  case	  the	  difference	  between	  treatments	  is	  
significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  =	  7.59,	  p<0.001).	  Similar	  to	  the	  expectation	  profit,	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  
significantly	  more	  often	  chose	  the	  HEPDs	  compared	  to	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=3.86,	  p<0.001),	  
but	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  1	  and	  3.	  
High	  damage	  payoffs	  
When	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  high	  damage	  payoff	  function,	  differences	  between	  
treatments	  were	  significant	  in	  expected	  profit	  per	  period,	  as	  shown	  by	  one-­‐way	  ANOVA	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  
=	  9.77,	  p<0.0001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  higher	  expected	  profit	  than	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  2	  (t=3.71,	  p<0.001)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=3.74,	  p<0.001),	  Even	  though	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  1	  had	  higher	  payoff	  per	  period,	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  is	  not	  higher	  than	  the	  
other	  groups.	  When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  fraction	  HEPD,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  the	  differences	  between	  
treatments	  are	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  =	  8.33,	  p<0.001).	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  chose	  the	  HEPDs	  
significantly	  more	  often	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  (t=3.48,	  p<0.001)	  and	  Treatment	  3	  (t=3.40,	  
p<0.001)	  
Likelihood	  sensitive	  payoffs	  
With	  likelihood-­‐sensitive	  payoffs,	  participants	  reacted	  differently	  compared	  to	  participants	  with	  
other	  payoffs.	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  
=	  67.98,	  p<0.001)	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs.	  To	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  treatments,	  we	  used	  
a	  regression	  model	  to	  estimate	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPD.	  These	  results	  show	  the	  differences	  
c	  between	  different	  treatments	  (group	  2	  coefficient=12.7%,	  t=9.19,	  p<0.001,	  group	  3	  coefficient	  
=16.9%,	  t=10.39,	  p<0.001)	  are	  significant	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  general	  case	  (across	  all	  payoff	  functions)	  
(group	  2	  coefficient=4.1%,	  t=6.54,	  p<0.001,	  group	  3	  coefficient	  =2.76,	  t=3.76,	  p<0.001).	  Looking	  at	  
the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  (F	  
(2,	  20457)	  =	  74.55,	  p<0.001).	  The	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  1	  and	  Treatments	  2	  and	  3	  increased	  
compare	  with	  conditional	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  decisions	  (group	  2,	  t=9.79,	  p<0.001,	  group	  3,	  
t=-­‐10.75,	  p<0.001)	  and	  the	  difference	  between	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3	  has	  no	  significantly	  change.	   	  
Impact	  sensitive	  payoffs	  
With	  impact	  sensitive	  questions,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  
significant	  (F	  (2,	  20457)	  =	  22.43,	  p<0.001)	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs.	  However	  unlike	  all	  
the	  other	  question	  types	  and	  the	  general	  case	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  3	  made	  more	  profit	  and	  had	  
a	  higher	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  the	  other	  treatments.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  3	  
significantly	  more	  often	  chose	  HEPDs	  compared	  to	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  (t=3.50,	  p<0.001),	  
and	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  significantly	  more	  often	  chose	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  
2	  (t=-­‐3.70,	  P<0.001).	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  these	  differences	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  between	  
treatments	  are	  significant	  (F	  (2,	  5111)	  =	  13.29,	  p<0.001).	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  
between	  participants	  in	  Treatments	  1	  and	  3	  (t=-­‐0.02,	  p<0.984),	  but	  the	  difference	  between	  
participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  and	  2	  is	  still	  significant	  (t=4.68,	  p<0.001).	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  
differences	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  expected	  profit	  between	  treatments	  are	  also	  significant	  between	  
treatments	  (F	  (2,	  20457)	  =	  5.58,	  p<0.0038).	   	  
Based	  on	  these	  results,	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  fraction	  in	  HEPD	  
across	  all	  four	  payoff	  functions.	  When	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  likelihood	  sensitive	  
questions	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  did	  not	  show	  significant	  change	  compare	  with	  other	  payoff	  
function,	  however	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  and	  3	  had	  significant	  lower	  fraction	  in	  HEPDs	  and	  
conditional	  HEPDs.	  Participants	  in	  Treatment	  3	  had	  the	  highest	  fraction	  in	  conditional	  HEPD	  and	  one	  
of	  the	  highest	  fractions	  in	  HEPD	  with	  impact	  sensitive	  payoff	  decisions.	  
Result	  4	  Participants’	  risk	  directions	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  payoff	  function	  and	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
warning.	   	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  know	  how	  participants’	  behave	  biased.	  On	  average,	  participants	  more	  often	  chose	  
the	  risk-­‐free	  decision	  than	  the	  risky	  decision	  (risk	  direction=	  -­‐0.052,	  standard	  deviation=0.437).	  In	  
other	  words,	  they	  had	  a	  slight	  preference	  for	  making	  a	  decision	  to	  move	  the	  product	  over	  the	  
conditional	  HEPD.	  This	  also	  holds	  for	  each	  individual	  treatment.	  Risk	  direction	  did	  not	  vary	  between	  
treatments:	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  the	  differences	  in	  risk	  direction	  between	  treatments	  is	  not	  
significant	  (F	  (2,	  20457)	  =	  1.83,	  p=0.16).	   	   	  




Average	   -­‐0.0516	   0.4364	  
Treatment	  1	   -­‐0.0553	   0.4101	  
Treatment	  2	   -­‐0.0540	   0.4574	  
Treatment	  3	   -­‐0.0406	   0.4441	  
Table	  6：Average	  risk	  direction	  in	  each	  treatment.	  
For	  the	  analysis,	  we	  assume	  that	  amber	  and	  red	  warnings	  give	  a	  signal	  of	  ‘move’	  (risk	  free),	  green	  
and	  yellow	  warnings	  give	  a	  signal	  of	  ‘not	  move’	  (risky).	  We	  classify	  the	  fraction	  of	  amber	  and	  red	  
warning	  when	  HEPD	  is	  not	  move	  as	  rate	  of	  false	  alarm,	  as	  the	  warning	  shows	  a	  signal	  of	  move	  when	  
the	  HEPD	  is	  not	  move;	  and	  we	  classify	  the	  fraction	  of	  green	  and	  yellow	  warning	  as	  missed	  event,	  as	  
the	  warning	  shows	  a	  signal	  of	  not	  move	  when	  the	  HEPD	  is	  move.	  We	  use	  these	  two	  factors	  to	  
evaluate	  warning	  systems	  in	  different	  treatments.	  We	  define	  Error	  Level	  as	  the	  fraction	  of	  false	  
alarm	  and	  missed	  events	  of	  the	  total	  warning	  issued.	  
By	  comparing	  low	  damage	  and	  high	  damage	  payoffs	  functions,	  we	  examine	  whether	  the	  fraction	  of	  
error	  level	  relates	  not	  only	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  event	  but	  the	  impact	  level	  as	  well.	   	  
Firstly	  we	  want	  to	  evaluate	  the	  warning	  matrix,	  as	  we	  defined	  green	  and	  yellow	  is	  sigh	  of	  safe,	  amber	  
and	  red	  warning	  is	  sigh	  of	  risky.	  So	  the	  optimal	  warning	  system	  should	  present	  green	  and	  yellow	  










1.66%	   6%	   7.5%	   30%	  
1.66%	   6%	   7.5%	   7.5%	  
1.66%	   1.66%	   6%	   7.5%	  
1.66%	   1.66%	   6%	   6%	  
Impact	  level	  
	  
Table	  7.	  The	  probability	  distribution	  for	  each	  element	  of	  the	  matrix	  
Based	  on	  Table	  7	  we	  can	  calculate	  the	  probability	  of	  false	  alarm	  (the	  probability	  of	  Amber	  or	  red	  
warning	  if	  the	  HEPDs	  is	  not	  move	  over	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  HEPDs	  is	  not	  move)	  and	  miss	  event	  (the	  
probability	  of	  green	  or	  yellow	  warning	  if	  the	  HEPDs	  is	  move	  over	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  HEPDs	  is	  
move).	  




Percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	   Risk	  
direction	  
Low	  damage	   15.8%	   0%	   79.1%	   -­‐0.0760	  
High	  damage	   0%	   23.1%	   84.9%	   0.0606	  
Likelihood	  sensitive	   23.3%	   22.6%	   73.4%	   -­‐0.1673	  
Impact	  sensitive	   0%	   9.1%	   85.3%	   -­‐0.0236	  
Table	  8：When	  the	  HEPDs	  were	  move/not	  move,	  percent	  of	  Green,	  Yellow	  /	  Amber,	  red	  warning	  and	  
their	  corresponding	  percent	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  risk	  directions.	  
In	  the	  previous	  discussion,	  we	  saw	  that	  when	  participants	  answered	  with	  high	  damage	  payoffs	  they	  
chose	  the	  HEPD	  significantly	  more	  often	  than	  when	  they	  were	  answering	  with	  low	  damage	  payoffs	  
(t=7.72,	  p<0.001).	   	   Error	  level	  has	  significant	  effect	  on	  conditional	  HEPDs,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  
the	  differences	  between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  negative	  (t=-­‐14.37,	  p<0.001,	  F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  
206.64,	  p<0.001)	  and	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction,	  one	  way	  ANOVA	  showed	  the	  differences	  
between	  treatments	  are	  significant	  negative	  (t=-­‐14.37,	  p<0.001,	  F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  288.88,	  p<0.001).	   	  
Table	  8	  shows,	  participants	  significantly	  less	  chose	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (t=-­‐15.41,p<0.001,F	  (1,	  20458)	  
=	  234.36,	  p<0.001)	  and	  significant	  more	  often	  to	  make	  risk-­‐free	  decisions	  while	  they	  did	  not	  choose	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  (t=-­‐22.16,p<0.001,F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  491.19,	  p<0.001)	  with	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoff	  
function.	   	  
With	  impact	  sensitive	  payoffs,	  as	  participants	  were	  sensitive	  to	  the	  impact	  level	  in	  these	  questions,	  
so	  error	  level	  is	  high	  on	  the	  likelihood	  level	  but	  low	  on	  the	  impact	  level.	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  
impact	  level	  is	  3	  and	  the	  likelihood	  level	  is	  40%,	  the	  warning	  color	  is	  yellow	  but	  the	  HEPD	  is	  to	  move	  
due	  to	  the	  high	  damage	  associated	  with	  this	  impact	  level	  (see	  Table	  1).	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  
participants	  significantly	  more	  often	  chose	  conditional	  HEPDs	  (t=9.65,p<0.001,F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  93.06,	  
p<0.001)	  and	  significantly	  less	  often	  chose	  to	  make	  the	  risk-­‐free	  decisions	  while	  they	  were	  not	  the	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  (t=5.30,	  p<0.001,F	  (1,	  20458)	  =28.05,	  p<0.001)	  with	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoff	  
function.	   	  
To	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  false	  alarms	  and	  missed	  events,	  we	  build	  a	  regression	  model.	  One	  way	  
ANOVA	  showed	  the	  fraction	  of	  false	  alarms	  and	  missed	  events	  have	  significant	  effect	  in	  fraction	  of	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  (F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  206.64,	  p<0.001).	  Both	  the	  fraction	  of	  false	  alarms	  (t=-­‐17.53,	  
p<0.001)	  and	  missed	  events	  (t=-­‐2.28,	  p=0.023)	  have	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  fraction	  of	  
conditional	  HEPDs,	  in	  other	  works	  the	  higher	  error	  level	  the	  less	  conditional	  HEPD	  participants	  will	  
make.	  One	  way	  ANOVA	  shows	  the	  fraction	  of	  false	  alarm	  and	  missed	  events	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  
on	  the	  participants’	  risk	  direction	  (F	  (1,	  20458)	  =	  288.88,	  p<0.001).	  The	  fraction	  of	  false	  alarms	  
(t=-­‐25.33,	  p<0.001)	  has	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  level,	  in	  other	  works	  the	  
false	  alarm	  level	  the	  more	  risk-­‐free	  decision	  will	  be	  made	  by	  the	  participants.	  The	  fraction	  of	  missed	  
events	  (t=1.92,	  p=0.055)	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  but	  is	  not	  significant.	   	   	  
If	  we	  look	  deeper	  in	  each	  treatment,	  we	  can	  find	  out	  that	  both	  false	  alarm	  and	  missed	  events	  have	  
an	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  in	  each	  treatment.	  Similar	  to	  the	  overall	  case,	  false	  alarms	  have	  a	  
negative	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  in	  each	  treatment.	  In	  Treatment	  1,	  the	  missed	  events	  had	  a	  
positive	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  (t=8.56,	  p<0.001).	  This	  means	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  missed	  
event	  participants	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  risky	  decisions.	  Missed	  events	  have	  a	  significant	  negative	  
effect	  in	  both	  Treatments	  2	  (t=-­‐2.45,	  p=0.005)	  and	  3	  (t=3.16,	  p<0.001).	  
Our	  results	  show	  how	  false	  alarms	  and	  missed	  events	  affect	  participants’	  behaviour	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  
conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  risk	  direction.	  The	  higher	  the	  error	  level	  the	  lower	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  
HEPDs.	  This	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  that	  participants	  have	  for	  this	  warning	  system.	   	  
Trainor	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  showed	  that	  participants	  felt	  there	  were	  less	  false	  alarms	  than	  the	  actual	  
number	  of	  false	  alarms,	  and	  in	  our	  experiment	  the	  false	  alarm	  rate	  is	  too	  low	  (maximum	  23.3%)	  
which	  dampens	  any	  cry	  wolf	  effect	  and	  we	  find	  no	  significant	  evidence	  for	  one.	  
Result	  5	  When	  participants	  received	  both	  warning	  color	  and	  risk	  information	  (impact	  and	  likelihood	  
level),	  they	  followed	  both	  the	  warning	  color	  and	  risk	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  warning,	  but	  
followed	  the	  color	  more.	  
To	  analyze	  how	  warning	  color	  and	  information	  affect	  the	  participants’	  behaviour,	  we	  built	  a	  probit	  
regression	  model	  to	  show	  the	  relation	  of	  dependent	  variable,	  whether	  or	  not	  participants	  choose	  
the	  risk	  free	  decision	  (not	  move,	  y=-­‐1)	  or	  the	  risky	  decision	  (move,	  y=1),	  and	  independent	  variables,	  
warning	  color	  and	  information.	  As	  only	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  had	  the	  full	  information	  and	  the	  
warning	  color,	  so	  we	  only	  looked	  at	  the	  data	  of	  these	  participants.	   	  
We	  define	  two	  new	  variables	  is	  (information	  suggestion)	  and	  cs	  (color	  suggestion).	  When	  the	  
conditional	  HEPD	  is	  not	  move	  is=0,	  when	  the	  conditional	  HEPD	  is	  move	  is=1.	  If	  the	  warning	  color	  is	  
green	  or	  yellow	  then	  cs=0,	  and	  if	  the	  warning	  color	  is	  amber	  and	  red	  cs=1.	   	   The	  probability	  
predictor	  of	  participants’	  behaviour	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  9.	  Pr 𝑦 = 1, 𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒 = ɸ(𝛽! + 𝛽!𝒄𝒔 + 𝛽!𝒊𝒔)	  
y	   Coefficient	   Std	  err	   z	   p>z	   95%	  confident	  interval	  
is	   0.8037	   0.0273	   29.39	   0.000	   0.7502	   0.8573	  
cs	   1.0127	   0.0276	   36.68	   0.000	   0.9586	   1.0668	  
cons	   -­‐0.3988	   0.0156	   -­‐25.49	   0.000	   -­‐0.4295	   -­‐0.3681	  
Table	  9：Summary	  of	  how	  information	  suggestion	  and	  color	  suggestion	  affect	  participants’	  
decisions.	  
The	  regression	  results	  show	  that	  both	  variables	  are	  significant	  and	  influence	  the	  decision	  but	  the	  
coefficient	  for	  cs	  is	  significantly	  higher	  that	  of	  is.	   	  
4.	  Discussion	  and	  conclusion	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  used	  experimental	  methodology	  to	  compare	  participants’	  behaviour	  under	  
different	  warning	  formats	  that	  varied	  based	  upon	  the	  information	  sent	  and	  the	  presentation	  format.	   	  
We	  discovered	  that	  giving	  the	  impact	  level	  and	  likelihood	  level	  helps	  participants	  make	  better	  
decisions	  (as	  indicated	  by	  the	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  HEPDs	  ).	  However,	  when	  
participants	  cared	  more	  about	  impact	  than	  likelihood	  because	  their	  damages	  rises	  steeply	  at	  higher	  
impact	  levels,	  those	  given	  only	  the	  warning	  color	  (Treatment	  3)	  more	  often	  chose	  the	  option	  that	  
had	  higher	  expected	  payoffs	  conditional	  on	  their	  information.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  an	  effective	  
warning	  system	  should	  not	  just	  have	  one	  presentation	  format,	  but	  should	  vary	  the	  format	  based	  
upon	  the	  needs	  of	  those	  receiving	  it.	   	  
Broken	  down	  by	  warning	  colors,	  participants	  more	  often	  chose	  the	  conditional	  HEPDs	  when	  they	  
had	  amber	  or	  red	  warnings	  than	  when	  they	  had	  green	  or	  yellow	  warnings.	  Participants	  that	  were	  
given	  the	  likelihood	  and	  impact	  levels	  (Treatment	  1)	  had	  a	  higher	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  
higher	  profit	  in	  all	  warnings	  except	  amber	  and	  a	  higher	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs	  for	  all	  warnings.	  In	  other	  
words,	  participants	  more	  often	  chose	  the	  HEPDs	  when	  the	  warning	  was	  more	  serious	  and	  the	  
potential	  damage	  was	  high.	   	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that	  when	  the	  warning	  color	  was	  red,	  participants	  in	  Treatments	  1	  and	  2	  had	  exactly	  
the	  same	  information	  (as	  there	  is	  only	  one	  red	  box	  in	  the	  matrix),	  however,	  the	  participants	  in	  
Treatment	  1	  had	  a	  significantly	  higher	  fraction	  of	  HEPDs.	  Thus,	  more	  information	  caused	  more	  
participants	  to	  follow	  the	  warning.	  The	  reason	  could	  be	  that,	  while	  they	  had	  the	  same	  information	   	  
participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  follow	  the	  warning	  because	  they	  had	  less	  information	  
about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  warning.	  Thus,	  more	  information	  could	  increase	  the	  trust	  in	  the	  warning	  
system.	  
Participants	  made	  different	  decisions	  under	  different	  types	  of	  payoff	  function	  (low	  damage,	  high	  
damage,	  likelihood	  sensitive	  and	  impact	  sensitive).	  With	  high	  damage	  payoffs,	  participants	  more	  
often	  chose	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  when	  they	  had	  low	  damage	  payoffs	  (independent	  of	  treatment).	  
This	  is	  more	  evidence	  that	  participants	  more	  often	  to	  choose	  the	  HEPDs	  when	  the	  potential	  damage	  
was	  high.	  
With	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoffs	  where	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  in	  damages	  between	  the	  impact	  
levels.	  Participants	  were	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  likelihood	  level	  than	  the	  impact	  level.	  Under	  such	  
payoffs,	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  more	  often	  chose	  HEPDs	  and	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  
participants	  in	  the	  other	  two	  treatments,	  while	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  2	  more	  often	  chose	  HEPDs	  
and	  conditional	  HEPDs	  than	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  3.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  design	  of	  the	  
warnings	  is	  not	  the	  most	  suitable	  for	  those	  with	  likelihood	  sensitive	  payoffs.	  Ideally,	  for	  such	  payoffs,	  
the	  warning	  colors	  in	  the	  matrix	  should	  be	  stripes	  with	  the	  red	  in	  the	  top	  row	  and	  the	  green	  in	  the	  
bottom	  row.	  
With	  impact	  sensitive	  payoffs	  where	  damages	  increase	  steeply	  at	  higher	  impact	  levels,	  participants	  
in	  Treatment	  3	  had	  the	  highest	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs	  and	  HEPDs	  of	  all	  three	  treatments.	  This	  
result	  shows	  that	  when	  participants	  cared	  more	  about	  impact	  than	  likelihood	  just	  giving	  the	  warning	  
color	  will	  help	  them	  to	  make	  more	  HEPDs.	  This	  also	  shows	  that	  giving	  people	  more	  information	  will	  
not	  always	  help	  people	  make	  better	  decisions.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  color	  was	  almost	  sufficient	  to	  make	  
the	  HEPD.	  The	  one	  difference	  from	  the	  ideal	  warning	  is	  that	  the	  level	  3	  storm	  with	  a	  likelihood	  of	  40%	  
should	  be	  an	  amber	  warning	  rather	  than	  a	  yellow	  warning	  with	  parameters	  of	  the	  current	  
experiment.	   	  
On	  average,	  participants	  more	  often	  choose	  the	  safe	  option	  when	  they	  are	  not	  choosing	  the	  
conditional	  HEPDs.	  We	  find	  out	  that	  the	  error	  level	  significantly	  affects	  participants’	  risk	  directions	  
and	  fraction	  of	  conditional	  HEPDs.	  Amber	  and	  red	  warnings	  when	  the	  HEPD	  is	  'not	  move')	  and	  
missed	  events	  (i.e.,	  green	  and	  yellow	  warnings	  when	  the	  HEPD	  is	  'move'.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  
higher	  the	  fraction	  of	  false	  alarms	  and	  missed	  events,	  the	  more	  participants	  chose	  the	  safe	  option	  
over	  the	  highest	  expected	  payoff	  one.	  
For	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1,	  false	  alarms	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  direction	  (as	  with	  
overall	  effect	  on	  all	  three	  treatment	  groups)and	  missed	  events	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  a	  
participants’	  risk	  direction	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  overall	  effect	  on	  all	  three	  treatment	  groups).	  This	  could	  
be	  caused	  by	  participants	  using	  both	  the	  warning	  color	  and	  the	  information	  contained,	  so	  it	  is	  easier	  
for	  participants	  in	  Treatment	  1	  to	  find	  out	  when	  it	  is	  false	  alarm	  or	  missed	  event.	  Our	  probit	  
regression	  model	  shows	  that	  when	  participants	  had	  both	  information	  (impact	  level	  and	  likelihood	  
level)	  and	  warning	  color,	  participants	  made	  use	  of	  both	  but	  followed	  the	  warning	  color	  more	  than	  
the	  information.	  
Overall,	  our	  work	  shows	  that	  while	  increasing	  the	  information	  content	  of	  warnings	  is	  usually	  
beneficial,	  it	  must	  be	  done	  with	  caution	  since	  better	  decisions	  (judged	  by	  higher	  profit)	  are	  not	  
always	  made	  with	  an	  increase	  of	  information.	  There	  are	  many	  directions	  of	  future	  research.	  We	  can	  
continue	  to	  run	  similar	  experiments	  with	  different	  parameters	  for	  the	  payoffs	  in	  order	  to	  better	  
pinpoint	  shifts	  of	  behavior.	  Also,	  in	  our	  experiments,	  the	  weather	  warning	  perfectly	  matched	  the	  
actual	  probabilities	  and	  level	  of	  the	  storm.	  While	  we	  did	  this	  for	  simplicity	  in	  our	  initial	  experiment,	  
actual	  storms	  may	  occur	  at	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  level	  rather	  than	  at	  a	  specific	  level	  or	  not	  at	  all.	  In	  
addition,	  there	  could	  be	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  storm	  given	  the	  chaotic	  nature	  of	  the	  
weather.	  Hence,	  giving	  warnings	  that	  have	  these	  additional	  realistic	  errors	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  
determining	  how	  people	  behave	  and	  adjust	  to	  mistakes.	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Instructions	  for	  Treatment	  1	  
You	  will	  participate	  in	  an	  experiment	  involving	  extreme	  weather	  warnings.	  If	  you	  follow	  the	  
instruction	  and	  make	  good	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  warnings,	  your	  payoff	  may	  be	  higher.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  decisions	  only,	  the	  other	  participants	  decisions	  will	  not	  affect	  your	  
payoff.	  All	  the	  decisions	  that	  you	  make	  during	  this	  experiment	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  will	  be	  
recorded	  by	  the	  computer.	  You	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  at	  the	  computer	  that	  you	  are	  seated	  at.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  you	  in	  cash,	  after	  you	  finish	  this	  experiment.	  
This	  experiment	  consists	  of	  60	  round.	  In	  each	  round	  you	  will	  see	  a	  graphic	  of	  a	  storm	  warning,	  
similar	  to	  the	  one	  below.	  You	  are	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  your	  product	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  
a	  potential	  storm.	  Moving	  involves	  a	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  no	  risk	  from	  the	  storm.	  Not	  moving	  has	  
not	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  risks	  damage	  from	  the	  storm.	  In	  this	  experiment	  we	  successfully	  
predicted	  the	  impact	  level	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  warning	  with	  100%	  certainty6.	  The	  vertical	  axis	  
represents	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  storm	  going	  to	  happen,	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  represents	  the	  impact	  
level	  of	  the	  potential	  storm.	   	  
	  
You	  will	  also	  see	  information	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
round,	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  all	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  loss	  that	  may	  be	  
caused	  by	  each	  level	  of	  the	  storm	  (all	  in	  tokens).	  For	  example	   	  
	  
Your	  task	  is	  to	  study	  the	  graphic	  and	  information	  of	  the	  storm	  warning	  you	  then	  should	  choose	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  all	  your	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place.	  
	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  round,	  you	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  storm	  warning	  and	  the	  payoff	  information	  
and	  then	  choose	  to	  move	  or	  not	  move	  all	  your	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  move	  your	  products,	  your	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the reason we add this sentence in the instruction is because during the pilot experiment, participants were confused about the warning system, so we add this sentence to 
make sure they understand the experiment	  
profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  be	  the	  money	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  round	  minus	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  
moving	  all	  the	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  not	  move	  your	  products,	  then	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  
be	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  period	  minus	  the	  loss	  caused	  by	  the	  storm	  if	  the	  
storm	  happened	  or	  all	  the	  money	  that	  you	  had	  at	  the	  beginning	  if	  the	  storm	  did	  not	  happen.	   	  
After	  you	  made	  your	  decisions,	  you	  will	  see	  information	  about	  the	  level	  of	  the	  storm,	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  storm	  occurred	  and	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  period	  similar	  to	  this.	  
	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  5-­‐pound	  show-­‐up	  fee	  plus	  any	  profit	  that	  you	  make	  in	  5	  randomly	  chosen	  rounds.	  













Instructions	  for	  Treatment	  2	  
You	  will	  participate	  in	  an	  experiment	  involving	  extreme	  weather	  warnings.	  If	  you	  follow	  the	  
instruction	  and	  make	  good	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  warnings,	  your	  payoff	  may	  be	  higher.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  decisions	  only,	  the	  other	  participants	  decisions	  will	  not	  affect	  your	  
payoff.	  All	  the	  decisions	  that	  you	  make	  during	  this	  experiment	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  will	  be	  
recorded	  by	  the	  computer.	  You	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  at	  the	  computer	  that	  you	  are	  seated	  at.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  you	  in	  cash,	  after	  you	  finish	  this	  experiment.	  
	  
This	  experiment	  consists	  of	  60	  round.	  In	  each	  round	  you	  will	  see	  a	  graphic	  of	  a	  storm	  warning,	  
similar	  to	  the	  one	  below.	  You	  are	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  your	  product	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  
a	  potential	  storm.	  Moving	  involves	  a	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  no	  risk	  from	  the	  storm.	  Not	  moving	  has	  
not	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  risks	  damage	  from	  the	  storm.	  In	  this	  experiment	  we	  successfully	  
predicted	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  with	  100%	  certainty.	  The	  vertical	  axis	  represents	  the	  likelihood	  
that	  a	  storm	  going	  to	  happen,	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  represents	  the	  impact	  level	  of	  the	  potential	  
storm.	   	  
	  
You	  will	  also	  see	  information	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
round,	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  all	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  loss	  that	  may	  be	  
caused	  by	  each	  level	  of	  the	  storm	  (all	  in	  tokens).	  For	  example	   	  
	  
Your	  task	  is	  to	  study	  the	  graphic	  and	  information	  of	  the	  storm	  warning	  you	  then	  should	  choose	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  all	  your	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place.	  
	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  round,	  you	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  storm	  warning	  and	  the	  payoff	  information	  
and	  then	  choose	  to	  move	  or	  not	  move	  all	  your	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  move	  your	  products,	  your	  
profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  be	  the	  money	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  round	  minus	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  
moving	  all	  the	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  not	  move	  your	  products,	  then	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  
be	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  period	  minus	  the	  loss	  caused	  by	  the	  storm	  if	  the	  
storm	  happened	  or	  all	  the	  money	  that	  you	  had	  at	  the	  beginning	  if	  the	  storm	  did	  not	  happen.	   	  
After	  you	  made	  your	  decisions,	  you	  will	  see	  information	  about	  the	  level	  of	  the	  storm,	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  storm	  occurred	  and	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  period	  similar	  to	  this.	  
	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  5-­‐pound	  show-­‐up	  fee	  plus	  any	  profit	  that	  you	  make	  in	  5	  randomly	  chosen	  rounds.	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You	  will	  participate	  in	  an	  experiment	  involving	  extreme	  weather	  warnings.	  If	  you	  follow	  the	  
instruction	  and	  make	  good	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  warnings,	  your	  payoff	  may	  be	  higher.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  depend	  on	  your	  decisions	  only,	  the	  other	  participants	  decisions	  will	  not	  affect	  your	  
payoff.	  All	  the	  decisions	  that	  you	  make	  during	  this	  experiment	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  will	  be	  
recorded	  by	  the	  computer.	  You	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  at	  the	  computer	  that	  you	  are	  seated	  at.	  Your	  
earnings	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  you	  in	  cash,	  after	  you	  finish	  this	  experiment.	  
	  
This	  experiment	  consists	  of	  60	  round.	  In	  each	  round	  you	  will	  see	  a	  graphic	  of	  a	  storm	  warning,	  
similar	  to	  the	  one	  below.	  You	  are	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  your	  product	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  
a	  potential	  storm.	  Moving	  involves	  a	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  no	  risk	  from	  the	  storm.	  Not	  moving	  has	  
not	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  but	  risks	  damage	  from	  the	  storm.	  In	  this	  experiment	  we	  successfully	  
predicted	  the	  color	  of	  the	  warning	  with	  100%	  certainty.	  The	  vertical	  axis	  represents	  the	  likelihood	  
that	  a	  storm	  going	  to	  happen	  and	  the	  impact	  level	  of	  the	  potential	  storm	  (expectation	  of	  the	  
damage	  of	  the	  storm).	   	  
	  
You	  will	  also	  see	  information	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
round,	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  moving	  all	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  loss	  that	  may	  be	  
caused	  by	  each	  level	  of	  the	  storm	  (all	  in	  tokens).	  For	  example	   	  
	  
Your	  task	  is	  to	  study	  the	  graphic	  and	  information	  of	  the	  storm	  warning	  you	  then	  should	  choose	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  move	  all	  your	  products	  to	  a	  safe	  place.	  
	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  round,	  you	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  storm	  warning	  and	  the	  payoff	  information	  
and	  then	  choose	  to	  move	  or	  not	  move	  all	  your	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  move	  your	  products,	  your	  
profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  be	  the	  money	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  round	  minus	  the	  fixed	  cost	  of	  
moving	  all	  the	  products.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  not	  move	  your	  products,	  then	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  round	  will	  
be	  the	  money	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  period	  minus	  the	  loss	  caused	  by	  the	  storm	  if	  the	  
storm	  happened	  or	  all	  the	  money	  that	  you	  had	  at	  the	  beginning	  if	  the	  storm	  did	  not	  happen.	   	  
After	  you	  made	  your	  decisions,	  you	  will	  see	  information	  about	  the	  level	  of	  the	  storm,	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  storm	  occurred	  and	  your	  profit	  in	  this	  period	  similar	  to	  this.	  
	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  5-­‐pound	  show-­‐up	  fee	  plus	  any	  profit	  that	  you	  make	  in	  5	  randomly	  chosen	  rounds.	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